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Abstract
Large-scale failures triggered by undesirable events such as natural disasters, massive power malfunction, and
malicious attacks are attracting serious concerns in communication network infrastructure perspective. However,
there have been few survivability strategy analyses in network mobility (NEMO) scenarios. To properly address this
issue, this paper proposes two novel survivability strategies to handle malicious attack propagation in NEMO scenario.
We use fraction of active users (FAU) to illustrate the NEMO survivability performance based on continuous-time
Markov chain (CTMC) and find the relationship between survivability performance and survivable strategy when facing
malicious attack in NEMO scenario. The performance analysis is helpful for us to choose the right survivable strategy in
the proper time.
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1 Introduction
In the previous years, the Internet has a significant
impact on all aspects of modern life. It is essential to
continuously provide the required data when facing
natural disasters (e.g., typhoon, floods, earthquake) and
intentional attacks (Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attack, power outages, worm virus) [1], espe-
cially in mobile scenarios [2]. As a consequence, the net-
work survivability has become a significant element for
network design and performance evaluation of network
systems. In recent years, the survivability has greatly
threatened by the network attack. According to the 2015
DDoS threat report [3], compiled by network security
firm NSFOCUS, which has stated trends and method-
ologies of network attack in the last year, the number of
DDoS attack is 179,298 in China. And the total flows of
network attack go to 276,531,562 TB. Moreover, the
propagation of network attack has increased significantly
in mobile network communication.
The network survivability has been a critical research
area of network security in the past years [4]. The term
refers to the ability of a network to continue to provide
services even in the presence of a failure [5]. Most stud-
ies regarding network survivability in the past primarily
focus on natural disasters and massive power failures
[6, 7]. In the papers [8] and [9], a continuous-time
Markov chain (CTMC) model is proposed to
characterize the network survivability performance in
the presence of static disastrous failures and repairs,
which is considered as a static disastrous event that
destroys network. Authors of [10] analyzed several in-
teresting characteristic of traffic flows in a fixed net-
work. However, there has been little work on network
survivability evaluation of network mobility.
The situations are quite different in mobile networks.
Mobile networks consisted with mobile Internet devices
such as smartphones, notebooks, and sensors are widely
deployed in moving vehicles (buses, trains, airplanes,
etc.). In order to manage continuous connectivity of an
entire network as it changes its point of attachment to
the Internet, network mobility basic support protocol
(NEMO BSP) [11] is proposed by the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) to standardize the relevant procedure
in this area.
In the NEMO basic protocol, there are four kinds of
communication entities, namely mobile routers (MR),
mobile network nodes (MNN), access routers (AR), and
home agent (HA), respectively. The MR plays the role as
gateways for all the MNN in the network. Besides, these
MRs will be the gateway to connect MNN with the core
network through AR and forwards the data traffic for
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the entire mobile network. More specifically, the MR
and HA exchange the mobility management signaling
messages once the mobile network changes its points of
attachment. Due to signaling management and packets
delivery, the mobile router may become the performance
bottleneck and single point failure by the malicious
attack.
The malicious attack propagation in a mobile network
is quite different. When a malicious attack happens, the
mobile network can go to the immunized state after
repairing. To fill this important gap, we establish differ-
ent math models of survivability in this paper and
propose two different survivable strategies: delayed re-
pair strategy and immediate repair strategy. And accord-
ing to the simulation results, the right choice of
survivable strategy sets has been given.
The main work and contributions of this article can be
stated as follows:
1. The mathematical model of NEMO survivability for
malicious attack propagation has been proposed.
2. Two different survivable strategies have been
proposed to improve the outage performance of
survivability in an effective way when malicious
attack propagation is initiated.
3. The relationship between survivability performance
and survivable strategy has been proposed which is
helpful for making the right choice.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 describes the system model for malicious
attack propagation. Section 3 describes the proposed
strategies. Simulation results are obtained and ana-
lyzed in Section 4. Finally, conclusions are summa-
rized in Section 5.
2 System model
In this paper, our objective is to quantify the survivabil-
ity performance of malicious attack propagation in
network mobility scenario; thus, the definition of sur-
vivability framework presented by ANSI T1A1.2 com-
mittee has been adopted [12]. As shown in Fig. 1, the
survivability performance is illustrated in the y-axis
while the x-axis indicates the time. In addition, we
give several attributes to illustrate the behavior of sur-
vivability. The measure of interest M is supposed as
the performance metrics of the loss probability in our
paper. Before an attack occurs, the measure of inter-
est M has the value m0; ma is the value of M just
after the attack arrives; mu is the maximum difference
between the value of M and ma after the attack ar-
rives; mr is the recovery value of M after the time tr;
and tR is the relaxation time for the network to re-
cover the value of m0.
In our paper, it is assumed that a certain network in-
frastructure consists of several core network and access
network. Take the access network as an example, its top-
ology can be easily derived according to network archi-
tecture. In our analysis, the node in the topology is
represented as a mobile subnet. At time t, there are
three different states. When the subnet has been
attacked, it is infected, which is called as infected state
(IN for short). We classify the healthy state into two dif-
ferent kinds: one is susceptible state (SP for short) which
is the initial state of a subnet and the other is the immu-
nized state (IM for short) which means it cannot be
attacked using the same approach.
Let a random variable Yj(t) denote a state of node j at









Figure 2 illustrates the state transition diagram of node
j. When node j starts at SP state, it can either transmit
to IM state with the attack repair rate (ARR) μ(t) or IN
state with the attack arrive rate (AAR) λ(t). Thus, if the
state of the node is IN, it can just transfer to IM state
with the ARR μ(t). Once the node is repaired, it will stay
at IM state. Furthermore, no matter which kind of state
the node stay at, it may transfer to IM state finally.
We use a directed graph to model the malicious
propagation procedure. This directed graph includes
nodes, which represent mobile subnets (MoSN for
short), and directed edges, which represent the pos-
sible propagation directions among different MoSNs.
Using a mathematical model, we evaluate the network




















Fig. 1 Illustration of survivability (adapted from [7])
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survivability performance of MoSN from attack arriv-
ing, attack propagation, and through to the process of
repairment finished.
It is assumed that the process of attack propagation
can be described as a continuous-time stochastic
process. The state of the network system can be totally
illustrated by the collection of the state of each MoSN.
At any time t, the state Y(t) can be denoted by a n-
dimensional vector as follows:
Y tð Þ ¼ Y 1 tð Þ;Y 2 tð Þ;…Ym tð Þ;…Yn tð Þð Þ; t≥0; 1≤m≤n;
ð2Þ
where for each MoSN 1 ≤m ≤ n, Ym(t) describes the
level of mth MoSN state at time t. There are three
different states that the mth MoSN could remain at.
Ym(t) = 1 represents that the state of mth MoSN is in
the SP state at time t and the attack has not arrived
at time t; Ym(t) = 0 indicates that the mth MoSN is in
the IN state at time t and the attack has arrived.
Ym(t) = 1 ' means that the mth MoSN has been re-
stored to the IM state at time t. Furthermore, the last
state is an absorbing state of all three ones. Based on
the above assumption, Ym(t) can be described as
follows:
Ym tð Þ ¼
1; if the node is in the SP state
0; if the node is in the IN state




Generally, the attack is assumed initially to occur on
the first MoSN. In addition, the attack and repair
transition is only determined by the current state of
MoSN and has nothing to do with the path to the
current state. It is assumed that the time of attack is ex-
ponentially distributed. Since AAR and ARR are tempor-
arily independent, it can be modeled using Poisson
distribution.
According to the above assumptions, the transition
process of all the MoSN can be completely modeled
as a temporally CTMC on the state space S. The
state space S is composed of a total of N = 3n states
as below:
S ¼ fðY 1;Y 2;…;YnÞ;Y 1;Y 2;…;Yn∈ð0; 1; 10Þg: ð4Þ
For each time t ≥ 0, the probability Fk(t) that the
MoSN is in state k of transient process S can be defined
as follows:
Fk tð Þ ¼ Pr Y tð Þ ¼ kf g; k∈S: ð5Þ
Let
f tð Þ ¼ f 1 tð Þ; f 2 tð Þ;…; f N tð Þ½  ð6Þ
denote a row vector of transient state probability of Y(t).
When the network system is in state k ∈ S, a reward rate
γ(k) can be assigned, where γ is defined as a reward
function. The vector of reward rates associated with the
state can be denoted as follows:
ϒ ¼ ϒ 1;ϒ 2;…;ϒN½ : ð7Þ
Suppose the probability of propagation from state i to
state j is denoted by pij, the transition rate matrix of the
process S could be expressed in matrix form as
P ¼
 
p11 ⋯ p1k ⋯ p1N
⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
pk1 ⋯ pkk ⋯ pkN
⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮




Table 1 summarizes the general rules for constructing
the infinitesimal generator matrix of mode for a network
with a general number of MoSN.
For the sake of calculating f(t), the Kolmogorov differ-




¼ f tð ÞP: ð9Þ
After that, we can get the probability vector of the
state
Fig. 2 State transition diagram of one node
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f tð Þ ¼ f 0ð ÞePt : ð10Þ
In this paper, it is assumed that the survivability per-
formance is regarded as equal to the network connectiv-
ity, which is the fraction of active MoSN in the network
system. Thus, the expected instantaneous reward rate
E[H(t)] gives the average connectivity of the system at
time t as follows:
E H tð Þ½  ¼
X
j∈S
γ jf j tð Þ: ð11Þ
However, different to fixed network, the most signifi-
cant aspect of the mobile network is that it should con-
sider the mobility factor. Therefore, we define the dwell
time of subnet k as tk to represent the mobility. Due to
its memoryless property, the dwell time of subnet k + 1
has no relationship with the dwell time of subnet k.
We assume tk follows exponentially distributed with
mean value 1/α
f tð Þ αe




The parameter α represents the moving speed of the
subnet. When α = 0, it represents the fixed subnet. With
the increase of α, the mobility becomes higher and more
dynamic.
In our paper, we analyze two different strategies to re-
pair the infected subnet. One is delayed repair strategy
(DRS) and the other is immediate repair strategy (IRS).
In DRS, the repairing action will start only after that all
the subnets has been infected. While in IRS, the repair-
ing action will start immediately as soon as the subnet
has been infected. The following will be described in
details.
As shown in Fig. 3, in DRS, the subnet starts to enter
area 1 and stays for the dwell time td1, then leaves for
the area 2. Assuming that the attack will occur during
this time period, the time interval between the attack
start time and the attack end time is tλ1. Only if tλ1 is
less than td1 could the subnet be attacked. Otherwise,
the subnet will leave area 1 and it therefore cannot be
attacked.
So the probability of mobile subnet attack can be
defined as
p10 ¼ p td > tλð Þ ¼
Z þ∞
tλ
αe−αtdt ¼ e−αtλ : ð13Þ
After all the subnets have been attacked, they can be
repaired during the dwell time tdk : Assume that the time
interval between the repair start time and the repair end
time is tμk : Only if tμk is less than tdk could the subnet
be repaired in area k. Otherwise, it cannot be repaired
successfully in area k. So the probability of mobile sub-
nets repair can be defined as
p10′ ¼ p td > tμ
  ¼ Z þ∞
tμ
αe−αtdt ¼ e−αtμ : ð14Þ
The timing diagram for IRS is depicted by Fig. 4. The
IRS model is quite different from the DRS model. Once
the subnet attack happens, it will start to repair this sub-
net. Only if the sum of tλ and tμ is less than td will the
subnet be repaired successfully in the area. Otherwise, it
cannot be repaired successfully in the area. As a result,




















Fig. 3 The timing diagram for DRS













Fig. 4 The timing diagram for IRS
Table 1 The rules for constructing the generation matrix
Transition state Condition Pij State i to state j
Attack phase i[0] = 1; j[0] = 0 λ1 (1,1, …,1)→(0,1, …,1)
{1′} ∉ i λ2 (0,1, …,1)→(0,0, …,1)
{1′} ∉ j … ……
L(i) = L(j) + 1 λn (0,0, …,1)→(0,0, …,0)
Repair phase i[0] = 0; j[0] = 1′ μ1 (0,0, …,0)→(1′,0, …,0)
{1} ∉ i μ2 (1′,0, …,0)→(1′,1′, …,0)
{1} ∉ j … ……
L′(j) = L(i) + 1 μn (1′,1′, …,0)→(1′,1′, …,1′)
L is the function to calculate the number of “1” in the state; L′ is the function
to calculate the number of “1’” in the state; state (1′,…,1′) ≠ state (1,…,1)
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the probability of mobile subnet attack is the same as
the DRS model. However, the probability of mobile sub-
net repair is different, and it can be defined as follows:
p10′ ¼ p td > tλþμ
  ¼ Z þ∞
tλþμ
αe−αtdt ¼ e−αtλþμ : ð15Þ
3 Attack scenario evaluation
As shown in Fig. 5, there is an infrastructure of net-
work system deployed in a certain geographical area,
which can be divided into two parts: the core net-
work and the access network. The access network is
composed by a set of MoSN, and it can forward the
packets to the core network using multiple access
routers (AR).
There can be three different types of nodes in MoSN:
one is local fixed nodes (LFNs), and the other two are
local mobile nodes (LMNs) and visiting mobile nodes
(VMNs). With respect to MN, LFN does not move to
other networks, while LMN can move to other networks
and usually reside in MoSN. VMN is from another net-
work and attaches to MN. VMNs and LMNs are re-
ferred as mobile nodes, and they are MIPv6 capable.
The MR attaches MoSN to the core network through
AR.
For simplicity, the network system which consists of
n = 2 MoSN is considered in this paper. It is assumed
that the propagation of attack occurred from the first
MoSN to the second MoSN in successive steps.
According to the above assumption, the transient
state can be described as double as (Y1, Y2), where
Yj ∈ {0, 1, 1 '}, j = 1, 2. Then, the set of the state space S
can be denoted as follows: S0 = (11), S1 = (01),
S2 = (10), S3 = (1 ′ 1), S4 = (00), S5 = (11 ′), S6 = (1 ′ 0),
S7 = (01 ′), S8 = (1 ′ 1 ′).
In our survivability model, the rate of the initial event
is out of consideration. Suppose the AAR of ith MoSN is
λ′i, the ARR is μi ' and the initial state of the network
system is (11).
When the attack arrives at the first MoSN, all the ter-
minals in MoSN will disconnect from the core network.
With the AAR λ′1, the initial state can be transferred to
state (01). It is the same for the second MoSN. With the
AAR λ′2, the initial state can be transferred to state (10).
To demonstrate our proposed model, two strategies are
considered:
3.1 Delayed repair strategy
In this strategy, only if all of the subnets have been in-
fected, it will go into repair mode. When the state of
subnet is staying at (01) or (10), the state can be trans-
ferred to state (00) and the impact of the network attack
propagation from the first MoSN to the second MoSN
should be taken into account.
As depicted in Fig. 6, if the state of the subnet stays at
(01), the network attack arrives at the second MoSN,
Subnet 1 Subnet 2 Subnet n
Core Network














Fig. 5 Attack scenario in the NEMO scenario
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and then all of the users in the second MoSN will dis-
connect to the core network. The state will go to state
(00) with the AAR λ′2. If the state of the subnet stays at
(10), the network attack arrives at the first MoSN, and
then all of the users in the first MoSN will disconnect to
the core network. The state will transfer to state (00)
with AAR λ′1.
When all the subnets have been transferred to the
state (00), the system could start its repair model. There
are two kinds of possible states the system can choose.
With the ARR μ1′, it may transit to state (1′0) which
represents that the first MoSN is repaired. However, if
the second MoSN is repaired, it may transit to state
(01′) with the ARR μ2′. Finally, once all of the subnets in
the network system have been repaired, they will transfer
to the immunized state (1′1′).
When the subnet is in the NEMO scenario, the prob-
ability of mobile subnet attack or repair should be taken
into the consideration.
In the DRS model, once the mobile subnet has been
attacked successfully, the damage rate should multiply
by the probability of mobile subnet attack; if the MN
has been repaired successfully, the repair rate should
multiply by the probability of mobile subnet repair as
follows:
λ1
0 ¼ λ1p10 ¼ λ1e−αtλ1
λ2
0 ¼ λ2p10 ¼ λ2e−αtλ2
μ1
0 ¼ μ1p010 ¼ μ1e−αtμ1
μ2
0 ¼ μ2p010 ¼ μ2e−αtμ2 :
ð16Þ
Based on Eqs. 8 and 16, the matrix P is defined as the
infinitesimal generator matrix of the CTMC. Thus, we
can describe the dynamic behavior using the Kolmogorov
differential-difference equation in matrix form as follows:
P ¼
‐λ1
0‐λ20 λ10 λ20 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 ‐λ2
0 0 0 λ20 0 0 0 0
0 0 ‐λ1
0 0 λ10 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 ‐μ2
0 0 μ2
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ‐μ1
0 μ1
0






Based on the convolution approach, we can obtain the
transient probability fj(t), j = 0,…, 8 in a closed-form as
follows:
df 1 tð Þ
dt
¼ − λ10 þ λ20ð Þf 1 tð Þ ð17Þ
df 2 tð Þ
dt
¼ λ10f 1 tð Þ−λ20f 2 tð Þ ð18Þ
df 3 tð Þ
dt
¼ λ20f 1 tð Þ−λ10f 3 tð Þ ð19Þ
df 5 tð Þ
dt
¼ λ20f 2 tð Þ þ λ10f 3 tð Þ− μ10 þ μ20ð Þf 5 tð Þ ð20Þ
df 7 tð Þ
dt
¼ μ10f 5 tð Þ−μ20f 7 tð Þ ð21Þ
df 8 tð Þ
dt
¼ μ20f 5 tð Þ−μ10f 8 tð Þ ð22Þ
df 0 tð Þ
dt
¼ μ20f 7 tð Þ þ μ10f 8 tð Þ ð23Þ
3.2 Immediate repair strategy
In this strategy, once one of the subnets has been in-
fected, it will switch to repair model. As shown in Fig. 7,
once one of the subnets has been transferred into the
state 0, it will start to repair the subnet, until the subnet
changed into the immunized state. Suppose the first at-
tack arrives at the first MoSN, and the state of subnets
goes into (01). In this case, the network system starts to
repair the model immediately. As the result, it can be
transited into the state (1′1) with the ARR μ1′. Then, the
attack arrives at the second MoSN, the state will transfer
from (1′1) to (1′0) with the AAR λ2′. It is the same to
the other case. When the first attack arrives at the sec-
ond MoSN, and the state of the subnets goes into (10),
the state of the subnets will soon transit into (1′0). No
matter which kinds of states the system stays at, it will
jump into the absorbing state finally.
Similar to the DRS model, the probability of mobile
subnet attack or repair should be considered. As a result,
the new damage rate and repair rate are as follows:
Fig. 7 State-transition rate diagram of IRS
Fig. 6 State-transition rate diagram of DRS
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λ1
0 ¼ λ1p10 ¼ λ1e−αtλ1
λ2
0 ¼ λ2p10 ¼ λ2e−αtλ2
μ1
0 ¼ μ1p010 ¼ μ1e−αtλ1þμ1
μ2
0 ¼ μ2p010 ¼ μ2e−αtλ2þμ2 :
ð24Þ
Thus, it takes the form of the transition matrix as
follows:
P ¼
−λ10−λ20 λ10 λ20 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −μ1
0 0 μ1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −μ2
0 0 0 μ2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −λ20 0 0 λ20 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −λ1
0 0 λ10 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −μ2
0 0 μ2
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −μ1
0 μ1
0





Similarly, based on the convolution integration ap-
proach, we can obtain the transient probability in a
closed-form as follows:
df 1 tð Þ
dt
¼ − λ10 þ λ20ð Þf 1 tð Þ ð25Þ
df 2 tð Þ
dt
¼ λ10f 1 tð Þ−μ10f 2 tð Þ ð26Þ
df 3 tð Þ
dt
¼ λ20f 1 tð Þ−μ20f 3 tð Þ ð27Þ
df 4 tð Þ
dt
¼ μ10f 2 tð Þ−λ20f 4 tð Þ ð28Þ
df 6 tð Þ
dt
¼ μ20f 3 tð Þ−λ10f 6 tð Þ ð29Þ
df 7 tð Þ
dt
¼ λ20f 4 tð Þ−μ20f 7 tð Þ ð30Þ
df 8 tð Þ
dt
¼ λ10f 6 tð Þ−μ10f 8 tð Þ ð31Þ
df 0 tð Þ
dt
¼ μ20f 7 tð Þ þ μ10f 8 tð Þ ð32Þ
4 Performance analysis
In this section, we analyze the numerical results of
two strategies. For the sake of illustrating the applic-
ability of the above method, the worm propagation is
adopted to evaluate the network system survivability
performance.
First, we apply and compare DRS and IRS for the four
different values of attack propagation rates schemes in
each strategy. The first is called the fast propagation fast
repair scheme (FF for short), which means its AAR is
high and its ARR is low. Similarly, the other three are
fast propagation slow repair scheme called FS, slow
propagation fast repair scheme called SF, and slow
propagation slow repair scheme called SS. Then, we
compare different strategies of one scheme and discuss
the proper survivable strategy for malicious attack
propagation in NEMO scenario.
We use reward rate E[H(t)] in Eq. 11 to measure the
system survivability performance, which is described by
the impact of active users at time t. In the system, we
define the normal value as all the MoSNs in the system
have been repaired, and the fraction of active of users is
1. Two subnets are considered in the analysis. They con-
sist of 150 hosts and 200 hosts, respectively, since the
maximum host supported by a subnet is usually 255.
For parameter setting of the AAR and ARR, we refer
to the data from [13]. It is believable that the value of
AAR is more than 2 orders of magnitude than the value
of ARR, and the unit of repair time is in hours. Based on
the different rates of attack propagation and repair, we
study four different propagation schemes to study the
impact on survivability performance. For simplicity, the
high rates of AAR or ARR are three times of low rates.
In doing so, our model parameters can represent the be-
havior of typical real network system.
As displayed in Table 2, we define four different
schemes based on setting different propagation rates and
repair rates.
One result is summarized in Fig. 8, where the chosen
repair strategy is DRS. From Fig. 8a, b, we can easily get
that if the repair speed is the same, it will have the same
fraction of active users (FAU) in the final. Different mali-
cious attack propagation rates will have the same impact
on the active users in the beginning. Comparing Fig. 8a
with Fig. 8d, it is easily known when MoSNs have the
same attack propagation rates, the performance of the
system survivability is better if it has the higher repair
speed. Different repair speed will have the impact on the
time of system back to the normal value. Comparing
Fig. 8b with Fig. 8c when repair speed is higher, it could
have the higher FAU at the same time.
As shown in Fig. 8, when malicious propagation rate is
faster, it will have the lower FAU at start. When the
moving speed of MoSN is getting higher, FAU decreases.
The reason is that mobility increases the difficulty of
repairing MoSN. Even worse, in Fig. 8c, d, when the
moving speed increases to the certain value, FAU will
Table 2 Parameters setting
Parameter λ1 (h−1) λ2 (h−1) μ1 (h−1) μ2 (h−1)
Scenario
FF 10 20 0.12 0.24
FS 10 20 0.04 0.08
SF 1 2 0.12 0.24
SS 1 2 0.04 0.08
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stay at very low value. It is possible, if the moving speed
is extremely high, the MoSN in the system could not be
repaired to the IM state. The reason is that the time of
repairing to the IM state is beyond the limit of MoSN
dwell time.
Figure 9 shows the result of IRS. In the DRS strategy,
FAU keeps the certain value in the beginning. It is not
affected by the increasing of the attack propagation
rates. As time passed by, all the MoSNs will be repaired
to the IM state and the system will be back to the
normal value. Similar to the DRS strategy, the system
could not be recovered to the normal value. Different
from DRS strategy, FAU increases in the beginning but
soon afterwards has the trend of declining. It means that
the mobility of MoSN is helpful to improve the perform-
ance of the system survivability at the initial stage. The
reason goes to that damage time of MoSN exceeds the
range of MoSN dwell time. Therefore, the attack to
MoSN has not become effective in the beginning.
However, as time goes on, the mobility has prolonged
the time of the system back to the normal value.
To better understand of the difference between DRS
and IRS, we choose the same scheme of two strategies.
As depicted in Fig. 10, the system survivability of differ-
ent moving speeds in the SF scheme is given. It is easy
to get that as the moving speed increase, it has the same
effect on the fraction of users in the two strategies. As
the moving speed is getting bigger, MoSN is getting
more difficult to transfer to the IM state. As a result, the
system has less active users at the same time. There is
another important thing can be drawn from Fig. 9. Com-
pared to DRS, IRS has better survivability performance
in the beginning, but it has to spend much more time
repairing to the normal value. The reason for this is that
MoSN starts to repair as soon as it has been attacked in
IRS. However, according to the model stated before, the
time of MoSN being repaired to IM state in IRS is more
than that in DRS. As a result, it is more difficult for the
system in IRS to repair to the normal value.
Finally, we can summarize two useful results from the
above. In IRS, the system spends much more time
repairing to the normal state but has the higher FAU at
the beginning stage. Therefore, IRS is applicable for the
system to keep the fine survivability performance in a
certain time. Another conclusion is that the system
under the DRS spends less time repairing to the normal
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Fig. 8 Survivability impact of different schemes (a–d) in DRS
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value. Therefore, DRS could be applied to the system
which should achieve better survivability performance
after some time.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented two new survivable
strategies when facing malicious attack propagation in
NEMO scenario. In our approach, we use CTMC analyt-
ical model to compare two strategies by analyzing their
dynamic behaviors. Simulation results have demon-
strated that DSR provides less repair time for IM state in
the NEMO scenario. Moreover, our results suggested
how to set the proper survival strategy for system with
higher FAU. For the future work, it would be helpful to
add optimization considerations [14, 15] into current
survivability research and extend our analysis to more
general mobile network scenarios.
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